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THE FEDERAL "DOOR-CLOSING" DOCTRINE*
THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE AS RELATED TO THE DIvERSITy
CLAUSE IN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CASES
JAMES

W. H.

STEwARTt

II. Suit in the Federal Courts of the Forum
The third problem* presented by the Wells case has never been
"laid upon the table" by the Supreme Court and explored, and this,
it is submitted, is the vice of the situation in regard to this problem.
That problem is, whether in a diversity case a federal court must
act in every instance as a "mirror" of the courts of the state within
which the federal court sits and apply the conflict rules of that state,
provided it would not be violative of the Constitution (Full Faith and
Credit Clause in the Wells case) for the state courts to apply such rules.
Such application by federal courts would not be required in the
instant type case if the federal courts are not bound to follow either
(I) the forum state's conflict rules generally, or (2) so much of such
rules as require the application of the forum state's remedial rules,
or (3) so much of the forum state's conflict rules as require the application of those remedial rules of the forum state which operate only
to close the state court's doors.
However, the Supreme Court has held that the federal courts are
bound to follow the forum state's conflict rules, 52 and in a broad
holding has held that this applies even when remedial rules are involved. 53 And relying on cases broadly requiring the application by
the federal courts of the forum's conflict rules which in turn require
the application of the forum state's remedial rules, the Supreme
Court has assumed that a forum rule likewise must be applied which
views certain transactions as void and closes the state court doors.5 4
In addition, the Supreme Court has assumed that the decisions in the
*This discussion is a continuation of Note (1954) i

Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 47.

Acknowledgement is made to Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr., of the Harvard Law
School for making the writer aware of many of the problems discussed here.
tAssistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
52Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. ed.
1477 (1941).

OGuaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. ed. 2079, 16o

A. L. R. 1231 (1945)-

"Angel v. Bullington, 33o U. S. 183, 67 S. Ct. 657, 91 L. ed. 832 (1947) (out-ofstate-created right.)
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above situations are authority for requiring the application by the
federal courts of a forum state rule which recognizes the validity of
the cause of action but which closes the state court doors without any
consideration of the merits.5 5 And all of this has been done without
making any distinction as to causes of action which are, without dispute, out-of-state created. Thus a federal court, where jurisdiction is
based on diversity, is required to act as a "mirror" of the forum state
courts.
To understand better the need for a re-examination by the Supreme Court of the "mirror" doctrine, an investigation must be made
of the more basic rule (from which the "mirror" doctrine was evolved)
requiring federal courts in diversity cases to apply some state court's
view of that state's substantive law rather than allowing the federal
courts to take an independent view of such law.
A. Applicable Substantive Law
The "mirror" doctrine was made possible by the overruling of
Swift v. TysonGG by Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.57 The Swift case involved
a suit in a federal court sitting in New York, jurisdiction being based
on diversity, on a bill of exchange dated in Maine but accepted and
negotiated in New York. Whether the endorsee could recover depended upon whether he was a bona fide purchaser for value or was
subject to the equitable defense of fraud; the question was certified to
the Supreme Court, which, on finding the New York law in doubt
'upon this point, held that even assuming the New York law would bar
the defense, the state law was established by state court decision arrived at by reasoning from legal principles and therefore the federal courts were not bound by it under the Rules of Decision Act. 5s
1W-Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U. S. 535, 69 S. Ct. 1235, 93 L. ed. 1524
(1949) (in-state-created right); Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 73 S. Ct.

856, 97 L. ed.

1211

(1953) (out-of-state-created right).

Ii6 Pet. i,1o L. ed. 865 (U. S. 1842).
7304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. i88, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
rSec. 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20o, 1 Stat. 92 (1789),
28 U. S. C. § 725 (1928), provided: "The laws of the several States, except where the
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply." A provision substantially the same is now
contained in 28 U. S. C. A. § 1652 (1949)Justice Story, who delivered the majority opinion, in construing this provision
stated: "The true interpretation of the 3 4 th section limited its application to state
laws strictly local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the State, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things
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After having thus cleared the way, the Supreme Court took the view
that the federal courts could, by independently reasoning from the
legal principles, arrive at an independent view of the law, it being
the type of matter in which the law should be the same all over the
nation. Thus the "federal common law" doctrine was involved.
The doctrine laid down in the Swift case was subjected to much
severe criticism and was finally rejected in 1938 by the Supreme Court
in the celebrated case Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.5 9 In the Erie case,
the plaintiff, Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured by
defendant's train while he walking along the defendant's tracks in
Pennsylvania. He brought suit in the Federal District Court of New
York, basing jurisdiction on diversity as the defendant was a New
York corporation. The defendant insisted that under the Rules of
Decision Act its liability should be determined by the law of Pennsylvania as determined by the highest court of that state which had
held that persons who use footpaths along the track of a railroad are
trespassers, for the injury of whom there is no liability unless caused
by wanton or willful conduct. The plaintiff, however, contended
that the Pennsylvania law was not statutory and that it was not binding on federal courts under the Rules of Decision Act as construed by
Swift v. Tyson. Thus the question was not which state's law would
apply, but, granted that a state's law would apply, whether the federal
courts could determine for itself what the state law was or whether
the federal courts must follow the state court's determination in this
respect. The District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals, took the
position that Pennsylvania law did not control, because "It is well
settled that the question of the responsibility of a railroad for injuries
caused by its servants is one of general law." 60 However, the Supreme
having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other
matters immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and character. It never has
been supposed by us that the section did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes or local
usages of a fixed and permanent operation, as for example, to the construction
of ordinary contracts or other written instruments, and especially to questions of
general commercial law, where the state tribunals are called upon to perform
the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and
legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or instrument, or what
is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern the case."
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 18, 1o L. ed. 865, 87, (U. S. 1842).
For a background study of events and views which gave rise to the Swift decision, see Teton, The Story of Swift v. Tyson (1941) 35 Ill. L. Rev. 5ig.
113o4 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
c,'Tompkins v. Erie R. R., go F. (2d) 6o3, 604 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
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Court reversed, overruling Swift v. Tyson and holding that the federal courts, under the Rules of Decision Act, must apply state law
as determined by the state courts.61
If the facts of the Erie case are varied as indicated below the
soundness of the holding by the Supreme Court in the Erie case is
more clearly pointed up. Suppose that Tompkins had had a companion
walking with him who was a co-citizen with the Railroad and injury
resulted to him also. Under the Swift rule Tompkins would be governed by one rule whereas the companion, not being able to come
into the federal court under diversity of citizenship, would have to
sue in the state courts, and if he sued in New York a different rule
would be applied (since the Full Faith and Credit Clause would require the application of Pennsylvania law of the duty) by New York
courts. Thus, two people injured by the same act at the same place
would be governed by different principles (in matters not of procedure
but of basic underlying obligation) depending on where suit is filed.
In the light of this supposition of what the Swift doctrine made pos62
sible the Supreme Court in the Erie decision had four possible bases
'For a note on the ways to ascertain state law see Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The Federal System (195) 628.
11. Political: Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82,
82 L. ed. 1188, 1194 (1938). Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v. Tyson (1930) i6
Va. L. Rev. 225, 234; Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 24 A. B. A.
J. 609, 614; Shelton, Concurrent Jurisdiction-Its Necessity and Its Dangers (1928)
15 Va. L. Rev. 137, 144, 149.
This basis for the Erie decision is founded on the basic assumption of a Federal system as distinguished from a Unitary system. See Cheatham, Sources of
Rules for Conflict of Laws (1941) 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 430, 437; Fellman, Ten Years
of the Supreme Court: 1937-1947 (1947) 41 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1142; Frankfurter,
Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts (1928) 13
Cornell L. Q. 499; Frankfurter, the Federal Courts (1929) 58 New Republic 273;
Shelton, Concurrent Jurisdiction-Its Necessity and Its Dangers (1928) 15 Va. L. Rev.
137, 146. But cf. 1 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United
States (1953) 363; Cole, Erie v. Tompkins and the Relationship Between Federal and
State Courts (1942) 36 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 885, 895 (in support of a unitary view
of the National Governing Powers).
2. Privileges and Immunities Clause Relation: Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64, 74, 58 S. Ct. 817, 820, 82 L. ed. 1188, 1192 (1938). See Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 390, 13 S. Ct. 914, 920 (1893) (dissenting opinion by Justice
Field); Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v. Tyson (193o) 16 Va. L. Rev. 225, 239;
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37
Harv. L. Rev. 49, 85.
3. Uncertainty of the Primary Duty under Swift v. Tyson: Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 75, 58 S. Ct. 817, 820, 82 L. ed. 1188, 1192 (1938). Hart and
Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System (1953) 634-635.
4. Uncertainty as to Litigation Outcome: Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64, 74, 58 S. Ct. 817, 820, 82 L. ed. 1188, 1192 (1938). Dobie, Seven Implications
of Swift v. Tyson (193o) 16 Va. L. Rev. 225, 239.
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for justifying the overruling of the Swift case: i) Political unsoundness-The unsoundness (in the light of the basic assumption of a
Federal system) of having federal courts exercise independent powers
of determining what the law is in an area where the states have legislative competence. 2) Privileges and Immunities Clause-This basis
would relate the doctrine of Erie to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Federal Constitution, in the sense that the primary obligation does not vary according to citizenship (whereas it did under
the Swift v. Tyson era). This consideration has greater force in regard to substantive primary rights or obligations than in regard to
procedural rights. 3) The Uncertainty of the Primary Duty-When
parties enter into a relationship with each other they do so with a view
to performance and not with a view to litigation. If different forums
would apply different standards involving the same relationship, and
it is not known which will be applied, confusion as to what will constitute performance is caused. Thus, this basis recognizes the unsoundness of having substantive or near-substantive primary rights and
duties depend upon the plaintiff's choice of forum (or the defendant's
choice, where he would have a right to remove) where that choice
could not be predicted at the level of basic action (that is, at the
level at which the parties undertake to perform duties or rely on
rights) which gives rise to the question. And it is at this level that uncertainty of choice is important, as it is material that the choice be
known because the parties are concerned with what the rights and
duties are. (They are not concerned with litigation; thus it is for this
reason that uncertainty as to procedual questions is not important at
the primary level of basic action-because they are not looked to for
guidance at the primary level.) 4) The Uncertainty As To Litigation
Outcome-the unsoundness of having the outcome of litigation depend
on the choice of forum when performance does break down at the primary level. It is desirable to have liiigation come out the same way no
matter in which forum the remedy is sought. However, since this kind
of uncertainty does not affect the vast number of primary activities but
only a relatively small number of activities where performance has
already broken down, it is not as important as uncertainty as to primary rights or duties.
B. Applicable Conflict of Laws
(i) In Re Substantive Law

The problem is complicated when in addition to diversity the
occurrence over which the litigation arose happened in a different state
from the one within which the federal court was sitting, and the in-
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ternal law of the two states is not the same. Although the Erie case
decided that the federal courts could not, under the Rules of Decision
Act, apply an independent concept of the common law rule respecting liability but must follow the applicable state internal law, it
was assumed that the applicable state law was that of Pennsylvania
(the place of the occurrence) rather than of New York (the place of
the suit).6 3 Thus the question was left open by Erie as to whether the

federal courts could make an independent determination of the proper conflict rule to apply in order to determine which state's internal law
would be applicable, or whether the federal courts must follow the
choice of laws rule prevailing within the state wherein the federal
court sits irrespective of whether the question is characterized as
procedural or substantive. The Supreme Court took the view in
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. 64 that a proper situation was
presented to decide the entire matter. In this case an agreement had
been entered into in New York, to be performed there by a Delaware
corporation. In a suit for breach of the agreement brought in a federal
court sitting in Delaware, a question arose as to whether interest
would be allowed on the principal recovery from the date of verdict
as was required by the New York Civil Practice Act 65 (inwhich state
performance was to be had) or whether another rule might be applicable. Justice Reed stated that the issue was whether in diversity
cases the federal courts must follow the conflict rules prevailing in
the states in which the federal courts sit. It is submitted that this
statement of the issue is much too broad, as choice of laws may concern
primary substantive laws or procedural laws since there are many
kinds of conflict rules-raising a whole host of questions, (to be discussed below) yet the issue as stated purports to embrace all of the
problems as a single question. And the Court, without considering
that the answer might vary according to the problem, assumed that all
the problems involved in this area could be settled by deciding the
single issue as stated by Justice Reed. It was then held that the Erie
decision prohibition against an independent determination by federal
courts extends to the field of conflict of laws, and that the conflict of
laws rules to be applied by a federal court sitting in Delaware must
conform to those prevailing in Delaware state courts. "Any other
ruling," the court said, "would do violence to the principle of unied.

6See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 520, 73 S. Ct. 856, 859, 97 L.
1217 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
"313 U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. ed. 1477 (1941).
"Sec. 480 of the N. Y. Civ. Pract. Act.

1211,
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formity within a state upon which the ... [Erie] decision is based.
Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts
in different states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves
to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right
to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors." 60 If
this is true, under the sweeping dicta of Erie, federal courts must apply a state rule of the remedy as well as a state rule of the primary
duty.
If the Klaxon decision is tested by the four possible bases for Erie,
it appears that Erie has been reduced by Klaxon to the fourth and
least important consideration. Testing these bases in the order set out
above, the following seems apparent: i) Political Unsoundness-In a
sense this consideration is not involved here, but it has ceased to be a
governing principle. It is not dear that Congress does not have the
right (that is, the power) to make a uniform rule-as to the allowance of interest on damages recovered in a federal court-though there
may be a problem. But this much is dear: it would not make sense in a
case like this to deny the right to Congress when New York-created
rights are being litigated but yet to recognize the right in Delaware.
Therefore, from the Klaxon decision it is clear that the basis of Erie was
not considered an attempt to match powers of Congress with powers of
the state and to say that if Congress does not have the power to change,
then the federal courts cannot; Klaxon refused to balance power between two states-that is, a state other than the one within which the
cause of action accrued was allowed to change the law respecting the
cause of action. 2) Privileges and Immunities Consideration67-The
spirit of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was to prevent different
measure from being applied just because there was diversity of citizenship-that is, to prevent getting a different result for that reason, or differently stated, to prevent a primary obligation from varying with citizenship. However, it was worded to prevent a different measure from
being applied to non-citizens than would be applied to citizens, for
occurrences within that state. Thus, the result of the Klaxon case is
that although federal courts are disabled under Erie from using diversity as an instrument for creating a divergence of primary rights when
8Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 1021,
85 L. ed. 1477, 1480 (1941). See Note (1941) 9 Chi. L. Rev. 113, 518, n. 29. For the
view that Erie should extend to conflict of laws see Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
(1938) § 12; McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal
Courts (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 126, 139. But cf. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of
The Conflict of Laws (1942) io8; Note (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. ioo2, 1007.
6rIt may be said that this consideration is not relevant because Tompkins in the
Erie case could have sued in New York in the circumstances of the Klaxon case.
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the occurrence happens within the state wherein the federal court is
sitting, federal courts are required to use diversity as an instrument
for creating divergence of primary duty when the occurrence happened
in another state. Therefore, to this extent, the Klaxon case is inconsistent with this principle of Erie and shows that Erie was not viewed as
being founded on this consideration. 3) The uncertainty of the primary duty-It is inherently undesirable that the plaintiff's choice of
a forum should make a difference, and if the plaintiff goes to another
state and brings suit in the state courts, the defendant can remove the
case to a federal court. But the Klaxon case puts it within the power
of the plaintiff to determine a state with favorable conflict rules which
may involve not only questions of "interest (money)" but more fundamental primary rights and duties. Also the Klaxon case puts it
within the power of the defendant, insofar as he is able, to avoid service of process, and it is not desirable that the federal system should
be used to create this kind of asylum. And, even more desirable,
is that the plaintiff or defendant may not obtain any advantage according to where suit is brought. Therefore, the Klaxon decision has
reduced Erie to the fourth consideration. 4) Uncertainty as to litigation outcome-To test this consideration as being the controlling one
in Erie, a rewriting of the opinion of Justice Brandeis should be attempted on the assumption that Klaxon is the law-that is, that the
choice the Supreme Court must make is between an independent
sitting. Would such an opinion have persuaded the Court to overrule
Swift?
Although Erie could not create complete uniformity of primary
legal obligations, it could move in that direction, and if parties went
into a federal court anywhere else (other than a federal court sitting
in the state within which the question concerning the primary obligation arose) the same result as to the primary obligation could be
reached; or if the suit were brought in another state's court the defendant would have it within his power to remove the suit to the federal
court there and preserve the uniformity without the aid of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause limit put on state courts, which limit the
federal courts, in diversity cases must also observe. However, under
the Klaxon decision, jurisdiction is reduced to the requirement that
federal courts do what the courts of the state within which it sits would
do if such would not be violative of the Constitution if done by the
state courts; whereas, the very purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to
prevent one state from nullifying rights created by the laws of another
state and not from any consideration of bias. And there is historical
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warrant for this position. 68 It was probably the confusion of basic legal
relations throughout the area of primary activity caused by the overlap
of two different systems of courts deciding plainly substantive questions
differently when it was unpredictable as to which system would acquire jurisdiction, together with the introduction of an element of
retroactivity into every judicial disposition of resulting disputes which
Justice Brandeis spoke of in the Erie opinion as the result of the unconstitutional course the federal courts had pursued under Swift v.
Tyson.69 But just because the federal courts ought not to try to administer (within the sphere of state legislative competence) their own
separate system of "plainly-substantive" law, it does not follow that
federal courts have no appropriate function in making more effective
the system of a particular state-namely, the state which has the closest
connection with the matter in litigatiton.7 0
In the Klaxon case Justice Reed spoke of "the right" of a state to
pursue local policies diverging fxom those of its neighbors. But, does
this "right" (in a federal system) have the same claim to recognition
when involving matters primarily connected with another state as it
does when involving matters primarily connected with the forum
state? 71 Also, why should the courts treat forum-shopping between
different courts in the geographical area as a great evil of diversity
litigation which Erie corrected as to the most important aspect of the
IsSee Federalist paper No. 8o. Also see Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
6 Jurisdiction (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 483.
OHart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The Federal System (1953) 634;
Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy (1953) 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013; Note (1949) 62
Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1o31. Cf. authority cited in n. 27, Clark, State Law in the
Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins (1946) 55 Yale
L. J. 267, 273.
'oWhere a cause of action accrues under the laws of one state and suit is brought
in another state and there is diversity of citizenship, the chances of uniformity
under Swift v. Tyson, Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, and Erie R. R. v. Tompkins as modified by Klaxon are as follows: i) Under Swift v. Tyson there are four possible courts
and three possible results; that is, two possible results in the two sets of state courts
and another possible result in the federal courts, so the chance against uniformity
would be three to one. 2) Under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins (as modified by the Klaxon
case) there are again four possible courts but only two possible results as each federal
court would do what the court of the state, wherein it sits, would do, so the chances
against uniformity are two to two. 3) Under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins (unmodified by
Klaxon and the uniformity of the primary duty viewed as of the essence) there, also,
are four possible courts, and again two possible results, but the chances for uniformity would be three to one as the two federal courts would apply the rule applicable
in a single state court system and the other state court might apply a different
rule.
7'Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System (1953) 633.
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evil, but then treat forum-shopping among courts in different geographical areas as an inescapable weakness of a federal system, which
72
Klaxon not only refused to correct but required to be possible? If it
is concluded that the greatest good of diversity litigation is a federal
court which perfectly mirrors a state court, does such a conclusion
73
attribute any rational purpose to the diversity clause?
It is submitted that Klaxon should be rejected and the federal
courts should develop one set of conflict rules in order to assure uniformity of primary rights and duties. If the plaintiff goes into a state
court, uniformity would not be entirely take care of, except to the
extent of constitutional limits; however, this is not too bad as the
defendant has the power to remove to a federal court, and having
one federal rule would tend to promote uniformity in the state
conflict of laws rules7 3b That is, (a) hope the state courts will be in-

fluenced by federal conflict rules, and also, (b) if both Erie and Klaxon
are not accepted but Klaxon is rejected, since Art. III of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court power to review as to diversity questions, if Congress would exercise this authority and vest this jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court, 7 3c then the Supreme Court could take jurisdic-

tion, under the Constitution in diversity cases, on appeal from the
state courts to see that the correct state law is applied. If the state's own
law is the correct law to be applied, the Supreme Court under the
authority of Murdock v. City of Memphis, 74 will accept the state
court's decision as to what that law is even though thought to be erroneous. But if another state's law is the correct law to be applied,
the Supreme Court would determine if the correct law was applied.
Thus, the Constitution could insure uniformity of the primary obligation in this area. On the otherl hand, if both Erie and Klaxon are
accepted there would be nothing for the Supreme Court to decide, and
the jurisdiction provided for in Art. III of the Federal Constitution
could not function. This may cast a shadow on Klaxon, as, otherwise,
it must be said that the framers provided something with nothing to
75
operate on.

7Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System (1953) 635.
1-U. S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
72bCf. Note (1941) 9 Chi. L. Rev. 113, 118, n. 29.
?3 See Note (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1002, 1oo5, where it is suggested that this
jurisdiction may have already been vested in the federal courts.
742o Wall. 590, 22 L. ed. 429 (U. S. 1875).

'However, it would not necessarily follow, if Klaxon were rejected, that federal
conflict rules would be a restatement of conflict rules or framed from the same
considerations. For instance, if both states had an unorthodox conflicts rule which
was the same in both states concerned, then if the federal courts had adopted an
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In Re Remedial Law Generally

Putting Klaxon to one side insofar as it concerns conflict rules
relating to the duty, (that is, assuming that in each instance all conflict
rules would recognize the duty) the inquiry then is: To what extent
has Erie as modified by the language of Klaxon (hereinafter referred to
as the Erie-Klaxon doctrine) been held applicable by the Supreme
Court. Consideration of this application to a great extent will be
limited to the problem presented in the Wells case-that is, whether
the federal courts must apply the forum statute of limitations when to
do so will close the federal court doors just because the state court
doors are closed. It seems that the answer to this might depend
on whether the duty sought to be enforced was created by the forum
state and on whether the statute of limitations of the forum state extinguishes the cause of action or merely closes the state court doors.
As already pointed out, the majority opinion in the Wells case ignored
the entire problem, supposedly considering the question settled. As has
been submitted, however, the Court has never succeeded in getting
the problem out on the table. That Justices who joined in earlier
majority opinions have later dissented or joined in a dissent when
such an issue was involved seems dearly to show that they did not understand the Court to be passing on this particular issue in earlier de76
cisions.
The language of the majority opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York 77 which was written by Justice Frankfurter almost assured a
blind application of the forum state statute of limitations, in the federal
court when jurisdiction is based on diversity, if the forum conflict
rule requires such application by the forum state courts. 78 In this
abstract conflicts rule the federal rule would engender a different result from the result in either state's courts. But on the other hand this is an exceptional situation
and the uniformity of primary obligation which would be promoted by a "federal"
conflicts rule would far outweigh any nonuniformity it would promote. Besides,
federal courts should be equal to the situation, for a federal court in this situation
is in a different position from state courts, as it could choose, disinterestedly between
two state laws whereas a state court must make the choice between its own law and
the law of another state. See Note (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1002, 1007 quoted with
apparent approval by Cheatham, Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws (1941) 89 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 430, 447.
"See notes 96, ioi, and 107, infra. However, sufficient new members of the
Court have gone along with the majority opinions in a series of cases applying the
Erie-Klaxon doctrine to problems covered by the broad language of Klaxon but
which were not in fact involved in that case, so that the problems of such application have never been discussed by the entire Court. See note 104, infra.
"7326 U. S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. ed. 2079, 16o A. L. R. 1231 (1945).
"Although in the York case the action was brought in federal equity, the
answer given to the issue would be a fortiori if the action had been one at law.
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case suit was brought against trustees for a breach of trust which was
not discovered until after the New York applicable statute of limitations
had run, and if the action had been brought in New York state
courts the action would have been barred. The question thus was presented as to whether the action was also barred in the federal courts79
sitting in New York. It would seem that the answer might well depend on which of the following four situations was presented: s 0
(i) Suppose that the state of New York was the state which created
the underlying substantive duties of the trustees to be faithful and a
right of action in the beneficiaries if the trustees were unfaithful and
(a) that New York would regard the statute of limitations not merely
as procedural but regard its running as extinguishing the right of
action-that is, that the cause of action has a life only for the statutory
period, or (b) that New York does not regard its statute of limitations
as substantive but regards it merely as door-closing. In the first situation, if the cause of action were sued upon in another state's courts,
it seems clear that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would require
the other state to apply the statute of limitations of the lex loci. It
seems equally clear that Erie would require the federal courts to apply
the New York substantive law. In the second situation the New York
policy of its courts not being available to enforce the cause of action
would not be offended by a suit in another state if the other state
court doors are open. Then why should it offend New York policy if
it is more convenient to bring suit in the federal district court sit:
ting in New York if that court's doors are otherwise open?
Or, (2) suppose that substantive rights sought to be enforced in
the federal court sitting in New York are out-of-state-created substantive rights and (a) that New York regards its statute of limitations as
destroying substantive rights, including those created out-of-state,3 ' or
(b) that New York courts will regard the New York statute of limitations as closing the state courts thereby preventing adjudication in
the New York state courts. As to the latter, again, why should the
federal courts sitting in New York be available to enforce state policy
which merely makes it more difficult for a litigant to enforce his rights?
Thus two possibilities are presented: (i) How the state regards
its statute of limitations is relevant, in which instance a determination of this point must be made; or (2) How the state regards its own
statute of limitations is irrelevant. Since it was not stated which of the
"OJurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
"'See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System (1953) 659.
61This situation might raise another constitutional issue. See Bank of the United
States v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361, 37o (U. S. 1834).
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four situations was involved, the Court seems dearly to indicate that
the only interest of the federal courts is a blind reflection of the results which would be reached in the state courts regardless of how
the state courts regard the forum statute of limitations and regardless
of where the cause of action arose. That the opinion was talking about
at least three8 2 of the situations at the same time is indicated by the
statement of the Court that:
"... since a federal court adjudicating a State-created right
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for
that purpose, in effect, only another court of the State, it cannot
afford recovery if the right to recovery is made unavailable
by
'8
the State... [within which the federal court is sitting.]"'

In talking about three of the situations at once, the Court again
violated the principle laid down in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authoritys4 of not deciding a constitutional question any broader than
necessary, and in this respect the case is just as bad as Klaxon talking
about all kinds of conflict issues at once even though various kinds of
conflict issues raise various kinds of questions. As suggested, however,
the position subsequently taken by Justices who voted with the majority in the 5 to 2 decision in the York case8 5 would indicate that the
decision of the York case was not understood by all of them as deciding that without more, if the forum state court doors were closed
and such is constitutional, the federal courts sitting there must close
their doors without further consideration.
'It may be assumed that the Court was not talking about the situation presented by 2 (a). See note 81, supra.
'Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, io8, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 1469, 89 L. ed.
2079, 2086 (1945). Further language of the York opinion to the same effect is: "It

is ...immaterial whether statutes of limitation are characterized either as 'substantive' or 'procedural' in State court opinions.
326 U. S. 99, 1O9, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 1470,
89 L. ed. 2079, 2086 (1945).

"Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 341, 347, 56 S. Ct. 466,
480, 483, 8o L. ed. 688, 707, 711 (1936) (concurring opinion).
'Majority: Chief Justice Stone, Justices Black, Reed, and Frankfurter (who
wrote the majority opinion). Justices Roberts and Douglas took no part in the decision. Justice Rutledge joined by Justice Murphy dissented. Cf. notes 96, ioi and
107, infra. However, although Justice Rutledge took the opposite view from
the majority, he did not get the issue of door-closing out on the table either, but
rather seems also to be talking about all three of the situations at once, and also
ignores the special problems raised by each situation. If the situation involved was
the first, that is, if New York created the duty and a right of action for a breach
of the duty and regarded the running of its statute of limitations as extinguishing
the cause of action, then it seems that Justice Rutledge is just as wrong in his dissent as Justice Story was in Swift v. Tyson as both are an improper view of the assumption of federalism; and the only argument which could be made against the
majority, if the statute of limitations is of this type, is one based upon emotion.
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(3)In Re Remedial Law Which Is Door-Closing
There are, however, several other Supreme Court decisions which
seem to indicate that if a state within which the federal court is sitting would close the doors of its courts because of state policy, the
federal courts must close their doors also. But it is submitted, the
basis for decision or the circumstances in those cases are distinguishable from the situation in the Wells case. In Griffin v. McCoach8 6 a
life insurance policy had been issued by a New Jersey company and
delivered in New York on a Texan's life, naming certain Texas citizens
among the beneficiaries. Later there was a change of beneficiaries and
an assignment was made in New York to assignees who had no insurable interest. On the death of the insured, the Texas administration
brought an action against the New Jersey insurance company in a
federal district court located in Texas, setting up a claim for the proceeds of the insurance on the ground that the assignment was void
because contrary to Texas public policy. The insurance company filed
a bill of interpleader S7 against the assignees. The Circuit Court of
Appeals failed to apply Texas substantive law or Texas conflict rules,
holding that the contracts of the insurance and the assignment were
both governed by New York law and by that law were valid. The
Supreme Court reversed, with directions that Klaxon was applicablethat is, the federal court must determine which law applied as to the
validity of the assignment according to Texas conflict law, and if
Texas law governed, it was to be applied in the federal courts, provided, of course, it would be constitutional to apply Texas law. Thus,
the Court was viewing Texas policy only as "closing the doors of
Texas courts to a valid foreign contract." However, the case seems
distinguishable from the Wells case in that Texas policy, as argued by
the plaintiff in the Griffin case, viewed the assignment as unenforceable
in the Texas courts because Texas policy did not recognize the assignment as valid, whereas the foreign cause of action in the Wells case
is viewed by Pennsylvania as valid and enforceable for one year buit unenforceable after one year in Pennsylvania. Even if the Griffin case be
considered not distinguishable on this ground, still it is not authority
for the door-closing doctrine except in so far as it is authority for having applied the doctrine, since the court did not explore the problem
and at most assumed the question had already been decided. A case
"313 U. S. 498, 61 S. Ct.

1o23,

85 L. ed. 1481 (1941) (decided, the same day as

Klaxon and four years before the York case, by an unanimous court). See Note
9 Chi. L. Rev. 141.
6149 Stat. io96 (1936), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (26) (1940).

(1941)
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similar to Griffin is Angel v. "Bullingtons since in both, out-of-state-created rights were sought to be enforced in a federal court sitting in a
state which did not recognize the validity of such rights. In the Bullington case, Angel, a citizen of North Carolina, had bought some Virginia land from Bullington, a citizen of Virginia, and had executed
notes in part payment secured by a deed of trust. On default of payment the land was sold and the proceeds applied toward the payment
of the notes. Suit was instituted in the North Carolina state courts
to recover the deficiency. A North Carolina statute provided that:

"[The] ...trustee... of ...notes secured by [a] ...deed of
trust shall not be entitled to a deficiency judgment on account of
such... deed of trust or obligatiton secured by the same .... ,,s9
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the North Carolina
Act barred Bullington's suit against Angel.9 0 Bullington then sued
Angel for the deficiency in a federal district court 91 sitting in North
Carolina. Angel pleaded in bar the suit in the North Carolina state
courts. Bullington recovered judgment in the district court and the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 92 but the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed.9 3 There are two possible
grounds for the reversal: 94 1) That the entire question is now res
judicata,or 2) That the question of the constitutionality of the North
Carolina statute closing the doors of the state court is res judicata and
the federal court must close its doors just because the forum state
court doors are closed. If the York and Griffiin cases are both doorclosing situations, and if these cases are to be adhered to, then it must
be concluded that the reversal if placed on this ground in Bullington is
correct as Bullington and Griffin cannot be distinguished on doorclosing grounds. 95 But a difference is that in the Bullington situation
8330 U. S.183, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L. ed. 832 (1947).
ION. C. Public Laws (1933) c. 36. For this same provision see N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(Michie 1950) § 45-21.38.
Bullington v. Angel, 22o N. C. 18, 16 S. E. (2d) 411 (1941).
'1 Bullington v. Angel, 56 F. Supp. 372 (D. C. N. C. 1944).
"Angel v. Bullington, 159 F. (2d) 679 (C. C. A. 4th, 1945).
',Angel v. Bullington, 33o U. S.183, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L. ed. 832 (1947).
O'See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The Federal System (1953)
668.
91
3 t is -difficult to read into the Rules of Decision Act one interpretation for
door-closing where it is a case of interpleader (Griffin case) and another interpretation where it is not a case of interpleader (Bullington case).
That the Bullington decision was based on a combination of both res judicata
and the Erie-Klaxon doctrine has been proposed by many writers. See Notes (1948)
36 Calif. L. Rev. 127; (1947) 6o Harv. L. Rev. 822; (1947) 42 Ill. L. Rev. 541; (1947)
45 Mich. L. Rev. 1057; (1947) 12 Mo. L. Rev. 333; (1947) 56 Yale L. J. 1037. But cf.
Note (1947) 95 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 795,
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there is a constitutional question involved, and if the North Carolina
statute is unconstitutional then the federal courts do not have to apply door-closing. However, in the Bullington case the state court litigation is res judicata as to the constitutional question, and therefore,
the constitutional question cannot now be litigated in the suit in the
federal court; but res judicata goes to the single point here of North
Carolina's door-closing policy being constitutional. Thus, if the York
and Griffin cases in interpreting Erie are door-closing, then Erie applies to the Bullington case.
However, Justice Frankfurter based the Bullington decision on the
res judicata aspect and assumed that something was decided in York
(and possibly Griffin) which the other Justices had not realized was
being decided. This assumption resulted in vigorous dissents in Bullington. 0 The Bullington case likewise seems distinguishable from the
Wells case in that North Carolina policy, as set out in the North Carolina statute, refuses to recognize a valid cause of action, whereas the
foreign cause of action in the Wells case is viewed by Pennsylvania as
valid but unenforceable in Pennsylvania. But, again, even if the Bullington case is not distinguishable on this latter ground, the same objection is present as is present as to the Griffin decision-the doctrine of
door-closing was not explored by the court.
Whereas Griffin and Bullington involved out-of-state-created
rights which are not viewed as valid in the forum state, another case,
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. 97 involved an in-state-created cause
of action which was not regarded as void by the forum but the state
court doors were nevertheless closed. The Court of Appeals9s applied
Lupton's Sons v. Autamobile Club99 which involved a question sub'Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority opinion, was joined by Chief
Justice Vinson and Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy. Justice Reed, who wrote
a dissenting opinion, was joined by Justices Jackson and Rutledge. Justice Rutledge, who wrote a dissenting opinion was joined by Justice Jackson.
""337 U. S 535, 69 S. Ct. 1235, 93 L. ed. 1524 (1949).
'Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 68 F. (2d) 701 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1948).
' 225 U. S. 489, 32 S. Ct. 711, 56 L. ed. 1177 (1912). A foreign corporation
brought suit on a contract in a federal court sitting in New York. One of the defenses pleaded was that the corporation could not maintain the action because it
was a foreign corporation doing business in the State of New York without a certificate of authority in violation of the General Corporation Law of that state and
that the state statute also provided that no such foreign corporation may maintain
an action in New York on any contract made in New York prior to compliance
with the provision requiring a certificate of authority. Thus it appeared that the
foreign corporation was not forbidden to make a contract but denied standing in
the state courts to sue on the contract, which did not deny the validity of the
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stantially identical with the question presented in the Interstate Realty
case and held that the federal court doors were not dosed just because the state court doors were, if the cause of action is recognized as
valid by the state within which the federal court sits. No reference to
Bullington or any Erie problem was made. When the Bullington
decision was called to the court's attention on a motion for a rehearing1 00 the Court of Appeals adhered to its previous decision saying
that the Supreme Court was concerned only with res judicata in the
Bullington case. The Supreme Court on certiorari reversed. Justice
Douglas, writing the majority opinion, viewed the question in Bullington, that is, the question of the constitutionality of the North Carolina statute being res judicata and the question of door-closing, as
alternative grounds for the Bullington decision. However it clearly
seems that both questions were necessarily involved in the decision.
Justice Douglas took the view that one of the grounds (door-closing
by North Carolina) followed York and viewed York as premised on the
theory that a right which local law creates but which it does not supply with a remedy is no right at all for purposes of enforcement in a
federal court sitting within that state in a diversity case and that when
in such cases one is barred from recovery in the state courts he should
likewise be barred in a federal court. 101 The reason for this, Justice
Douglas argued, is that a contra result would create discrimination
against citizens of the state in favor of those authorized to invoke
the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court and that it was this
element of discrimination which Erie was designed to eliminate. But
Justice Douglas overlooked the fact that North Carolina did not create
the right in Bullington and that Bullington dealt with an out-of-statecreated right viewed as invalid, and with full faith and credit. Thus
Interstate Realty mixed the federal court's attitude as to out-of-statecreated rights viewed as invalid when judged by local policy and instate-created rights which were .viewed as valid. The dissent in Interstate Realty emphasized that the state did not deprive the transaction of its validity or any self-enforcing remedy which the plaintiff
might have had or of resort to federal courts, and the dissent
protested the Court's refusal to give the state statute the same limited
contract. The Supreme Court, however, held that, although a state may close the
doors of its courts in such a circumstance, a state could not close the doors of the
federal courts to a suit on a valid contract.
'1°Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 17o F. (2d) 694 (C. A. 5 th, 1948).
mWoods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U. S. 535, 538, 69 S. Ct. 1235, 1237, 93 L.
ed. 1524, 1527 (1949). Justices Jackson and Rutledge, who dissented in the Bullington case, dissented in this case. Justice Burton also dissented in this case.
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effect. As the dissent pointed out: "The penalty... [the Supreme Court
is handing out] does not go to the State which sustained the injury,
but results in unjust enrichment of the debtor, who has suffered no
injury from the creditor's default in qualification [to do business in the
state]."1

02

The Wells case is dearly distinguishable from the Interstate Realty
case, since the latter deals with an in-state-created cause of action,
whereas the former deals with an out-of-state-created cause of action.
The apparent dissatisfaction with the federal court door-dosing
doctrine has caused some of the Justices to go to great lengths to avoid
10 3
the problem.
In none of the cases since the York case has door-dosing been examined by the whole Court; and as pointed out, it is not known which
of the situations possibly involved in the York case was presented, as the
"C-Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U. S. 535, 538, 54 o , 69 S. Ct. 1235, 1237,
1238, 93 L. ed. 1524, 1527, 1528 (1949).
"In First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U. S. 396, 92
S. Ct. 421, 96 L. ed. 441 (1952), an air accident had occurred in Utah, which state
had a wrongful death statute, but Illinois, where an action on the Utah statute
was instituted in the federal court, had a statute which provided that no action for
out-of-state cause of action for wrongful death shall be brought in Illinois if service of process could have been had in a suit in the state where the wrongful death
occurred. Again two questions are presented: i) Could the Illinois statute be constitutionally applied in the Illinois state courts; and, if so, 2) does it necessarily
follow that the federal court must close its doors just because the state court
doors are closed? It should be noted that these are the same two questions being
considered in the Wells situation. A majority of the Court [the majority opinion
was written by Justice Black, Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Douglas, Burton
and Clark joining. Two Justices, Jackson and Minton concurred on specific grounds.
Justices Reed and Frankfurter dissented] consisting of five Justices took the view
that Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609, 71 S. Ct. 980, 95 L. ed. 1212 (1951), where it
was held that a Wisconsin statute similar to the Illinois statute could not constitutionally be applied was authority for holding the Illinois statute unconstitutional as violative of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. But the Wisconsin statute
did not contain the condition: "[if... service of process in such suit may be had
upon the defendant in such place," whereas the Illinois statute did. Ill. Rev. Stat. c.
70, §2. Thus, the Illinois statute is more reasonable. The majority found itself
in the position of having to stretch the Full Faith and Credit Clause far to hold
the Illinois statute unconstitutional in order to keep from having to say the federal
court doors were closed if the statute were constitutional. A dissent of two Justices
took the position that the Illinois statute was reasonable and constitutional and
should close the federal court doors as well as the state court doors. A concurring
opinion of two Justices agreed with the dissent that the statute was reasonable and
constitutional but agreed with the majority on result because the concurring
Justices view the statute merely as state court door-closing as to an out-of-statecreated right which could not close the doors of a federal court sitting in a diversity case in the state. Cf. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 519, 73
S. Ct. 856, 859, 97 L. ed. 1211, 1216 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
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Court discussed door-closing without reference to any particular one of
the possible situations. And as pointed out, it does not appear that all
of the Justices in the majority in the York case understood in that
case that the Court was deciding as much as the majority in later cases
have held it to mean. 04
The majority of the Justices of the present Court 05 apparently have
taken the position that "door-closing" no longer alone presents a substantial question. One of the four possible situations in the York casean out-of-state-created cause of action which the forum state views as
valid but for which the state no longer affords a remedy although a
remedy exists at the lex loci-was presented in the Wells case, but
the majority opinion completely ignored it, even though the problem
was called to the attention of the majority by the dissent.06 And of
all the possible situations, to adhere to door-closing in the situation
presented in the Wells case places plaintiff in the worst possible
position. This was very ably pointed out in part by the vigorous dis07
sent to the majority opinion in the Wells case:'
"[A] ... very practical consideration indicates the unworkability of a doctrine for federal courts that the place of trial is the
sole factor which determines the law of the case. 28 U. S. C. §
1404 (a) authorizes certain transfers of any civil action from state
to state for the convenience of witnesses or of parties, or in the interest of justice. The purpose was to adopt for federal courts the
principles of forum non conveniens. These are broad and imprecise and involve such considerations as the state of the court's
docket. Are we then to understand that parties may get a change
of law as a bonus for a change of venue? If the law of the forum
in which the case is tried is to be the sole test of substantive
law.., conflicts of laws and other doctrines... then shopping
for a favorable law via the forum non conveniens route opens up
"'The majority position has been maintained by new members of the court
who were not sitting when the York case was decided; e.g. Chief Justice Vinson
voted with the majority in the Bullington, Interstate Realty, and the Wells cases.
Justice Burton voted with the majority in the Bullington and Wells cases.
'1The majority (when the Wells case was decided) consisted of Chief Justice
Vinson, Justices Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Burton. Since the Wells decision
was handed down Chief Justice Vinson has died.
1This does not mean, however, that in the other of the possible situations in
the York case the Court has independently considered each of the problems. Cf.
Angcl v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183, 67 S. Ct. 657, 91 L. ed. 832 (1947).
10-Justice Jackson, who wrote the dissent, was joined by Justices Black and
Minton. It should be noted that Justice Black who voted with the majority in the
York, Griffin, and Bullington cases has now joined the minority which seems to
indicate that he did not view these cases as requiring a blind closing of the federal
court doors just because the forum state court doors were closed.
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possibilities of conflict, confusion and injustice greater than anything Swift v. Tyson... ever held."108
However, in tort actions, at least, plaintiffs are in even worse position. In the York case the majority of the Court said that "the fortuitous circumstance of residence out of a state of one of the parties to
a litigation ought not to give rise to a discrimination against others
equally concerned but locally resident." It is submitted that the outof-state party is the one discriminated against as he is in a helpless
position, whereas the in-state party is not. This conclusion is based
on what seems to be a reasonable assumption that in the usual case the
defendant has injured the plaintiff in the plaintiff's place of residence
and has left and returned to his own place of residence, the forum
state. If the suit had been brought at the place of injury, the defendant is in no position to complain about the law because by going
there, he takes the law as he finds it. If the plaintiff is dissatisfied
with the existing law at his place of residence, he cannot complain
because he has recourse to the legislature of the state and he could
have complained earlier about the law of that state and could have
brought political pressure to change such law. In fact, even where
the cause of action is a foreign one, the plaintiff is protected against
a harsh forum law to some extent if the forum law refuses to recognize any cause of action arising out of a particular situation, because
the residents of the forum state, not knowing whether they will be
plaintiffs or defendants, will more likely exert political pressure to
change such a law. Also, in such a situation the Full Faith and Credit
Clause offers some protection against a complete refusal to recognize
the validity of a cause of action arising out-of-state. 10 9 Where, however,
the forum state recognizes the validity of an out-of-state-created cause
of action but limits the remedy to an extent greater than the state
wherein the cause of action accrued but not to such an extent as to
deny full faith and credit, the out-of-state plaintiff is in the worst
possible position. In-state parties might not have as much motive to
exert political pressure to bring about a change, as the existing law
may meet their needs; however, another measure may be required for
the needs of residents of other states and such residents might resist
legislation limiting remedies. In such a situation, when a defendant returns to his own state and a plaintiff is forced to go to that place to
'0XVells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514,

1211, 12o18 (1953)1

522,

73 S. Ct. 856, 86o, 97 L .ed.

'JSee Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U. S. 535, 69 S. Ct. 1235, 93 L. ed.

1524

(1949).
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bring suit, to require that local law be applied to him in the federal
courts" ° would be to apply a law which he has not voluntarily subjected himself to"' and which he had no political competence in formulating and no political competence to change.
Again, it makes no sense to deny the right to Congress to legislate
as to the remedy of state-created rights, if such be the case, and on the
same facts turn around and give the right to another state.
It would seem that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
Diversity Clause of the Constitution are interrelated-that is, although
the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not in every instance completely
protect out-of-state-created rights, another forum has been provided
under the Diversity Clause to fill the gap, and that forum is the
federal courts. To construe the Full Faith and Credit Clause to permit
reasonable local policy to be adhered to without violating that clause
and at the same time to say that a federal court sitting in a diversity
suit must apply that same local policy makes possible a place of
asylum from suit under the Griffin and Bullington type situation and
after a lapse of time under the Wells situation, even though the place
which has the closest connection with the circumstances giving rise
to the cause of action provides a longer period within which to enforce rights. There is nothing in the history of the Constitutional
Convention to indicate that asylum from suit was sought-but otherwise.112

u1 It is understandable that there is no claim on the state court to apply out-ofstate law where the Full Faith and Credit Clause has been complied with. See Note
(1954) 11 Wash. &Lee L. Rev. 47.
1
-Unless it can be said that he has subjected himself to that law by seeking
a remedy for a wrong.
"-Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of The Conflict of Laws (1942) 138; BrohKahn, Amendment by Decision-More on The Erie Case (1941) 3o Ky. L. J. 3, 19.

Washington and Lee Law Review
Member of the Southern Law Review Conference
Number 2

1954

Volume XI

BOARD OF STUDENT EDITORS
Editor
DONALD S. LATOuRETrE
Assistant Editors
WILLIAM

C.

GUTHRIE, JR.

ROBERT

R.

KANE,

III

JOHN P. WARD
Contributors

0. ABBOTT

WILLIAM

R.

H. ANDERSON
WILLIAM M. BAILEY
RICHARD F. BROUDY
JOSEPH H. CHUMBLEY

WILLIAM

H. DRAPER

GRAY C. CASTLE

WILLIAM B. POFF

ROBERT
MARVIN

JOHN

F.

COGAR

KAY, JR.

ALVIN Y. MILBERG
LAWVRENCE C. MUSGROVE

KIMBER L. WHITE
Business Manager
HARRY

J.

GRIM

BOARD OF FACULTY EDITORS
Editor
THEODORE

A.

SMEDLEY

Business Manager
JAMES W. H. STE-WART

H.

MILTON COLVIN
CHARLES V. LAUGHLIN
CHARLES

P.

LIGHT, JR.

CHARLES R. McDoWELL
WILFRED J. RITZ
CLAYTON

E.

WILLIAMS

Published twice a year by the School of Law, Washington and Lee University,
Lexington, Virginia. Subscription price, $2.o0 per year, $i.oo per issue. If a subscriber wishes his subscription to THE Rvmv discontinued at its expiration, notice
to that effect should be given; otherwise it is assumed that a continuation is desired.
The materials published here state the views of the writers. THE REvnwv takes no
responsibility for any statement made, and publication does not imply agreement
with the views expressed.

